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England’s Dissatisfactions and the Conservative Dilemma 
 
Charlie Jeffery, Ailsa Henderson, Roger Scully and Richard Wyn Jones1 
 
England has long been the odd one out in the UK’s devolution era. As the only component 
nation of the UK without its own political institutions after 1999 it was the ‘gaping hole’ of 
the devolution settlement (Hazell 2006: 38). But it was also the ‘lion that didn’t roar’ (Curtice 
and Heath 2000): despite the institutional recognition of Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland people in England did not seem concerned about their lack of institutional 
recognition. This was seemingly confirmed by the unceremonious rejection of the then 
Labour Government’s plans to establish elected regional assemblies in England in the 2004 
referendum in the North East. Perhaps, as Vernon Bogdanor suggested, the English didn’t 
need special political recognition. Because of the sheer size of the English contingent of MPs 
in the House of Commons, relative to that of the other UK nations, people in England had 
‘no need to bang the drum or blow the bugle’ (McKay Commission 2013: 23). Through their 
MPs they dominated anyway. 
 This narrative of England as exception, confident in the advantages bestowed by its 
size and looking benignly on devolution elsewhere, was exploded by Prime Minister David 
Cameron on 19 September 2014. Speaking the day after Scotland voted No in its 
independence referendum he announced, to general surprise, that: 
 
I have long believed that a crucial part missing from this national discussion is 
England. We have heard the voice of Scotland – and now the millions of voices of 
England must also be heard. The question of English votes for English laws – the so-
called West Lothian question – requires a decisive answer. 
 
While the timing of this intervention may have surprised, its logic should not have 
done. The Conservative Party had, after all, notionally been in favour of ‘English votes for 
English laws’ – now known in general shorthand as EVEL – at every UK election since 2001. 
In 2012 the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition then appointed what became known as 
the McKay Commission to explore how EVEL might be implemented. And prominent 
individuals like John Redwood on the Conservative backbenches, but also Jon Cruddas and 
John Denham in the Labour Party, were beginning to argue that their parties should begin to 
think about England as a distinctive political battleground. They had good reason. As this 
contribution goes on to show, a distinctive set of English political issues had begun to 
emerge which underpinned a growing feeling that England should have an institutionalised 
voice in the UK political system. And that demand for voice had found some kind of 
advocate in Nigel Farage’s UK Independence Party. UKIP, despite the ‘UK’ in its title, was 
finding that its anti-establishment appeal resonated especially in England (Jeffery et al 2014: 
26-32). With that UKIP had the potential to shape outcomes in both Labour and 
Conservative marginals in the 2015 UK election [indeed, although UKIP won only one seat 
in May 2015, it won well over a hundred second places and around 3.9 million votes mainly 
in – and in all parts of –England].  
While Labour under Ed Miliband did little to respond to this UKIP challenge in 
England, the Conservative Party did. The September 2014 Scottish referendum gave 
additional impetus when the surge in support for the Yes campaign in the last few weeks 
before the referendum led to the ‘Vow’ to give stronger devolution to Scotland if it remained 
within the UK. Figures like Redwood and Boris Johnson argued that yet further powers for 
Scotland were unfair to a neglected England and needed to be balanced by a move towards 
EVEL, which would remove Scottish MPs from decision-making in the House of Commons 
that specifically affected England. This Conservative linkage of Scottish devolution and 
EVEL had a clear tactical logic. The Conservatives’ electoral weakness in Scotland – they had 
one seat to defend in May 2015 – meant they had little to lose from EVEL, unlike Labour or 
the Scottish National Party. All this formed the backdrop to Cameron’s 19th September 
announcement.  
There followed a failed attempt to set up a cross-party mechanism for exploring 
EVEL and then, in January 2015 an announcement by the then Leader of the House of 
Commons, William Hague, of the Conservative Party’s own proposals for EVEL. These were 
taken forward into the Conservative general election manifesto and became part of a 
package of issues promoted as ‘the Conservative Party English Manifesto’ in English 
constituencies, including EVEL, a proposed English rate of income tax, and the so-called 
‘Carlisle Principle’ under which voters in the borderlands of northern England would be 
protected against the iniquities said to be visited upon them by policies enacted across the 
border by the Scottish Parliament. All this was reinforced by the use of visual imagery 
designed to present the Scottish National Party (SNP) – and, by implication, Scotland – as a 
threat in England: election posters of Ed Miliband tucked into former SNP leader Alex 
Salmond’s breast pocket or as the current SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon’s puppet, or of 
Salmond pickpocketing (we presume) a good citizen of England to fund public spending in 
Scotland. Here was a concerted effort not just to appeal specifically to English voters, but 
also to do so by mobilising them against Scotland. It was carried through after the 
Conservative victory in May 2015 with the introduction of a version of EVEL in an 
amendment to the rules of procedure of the House of Commons in October 2015. This 
requires that a majority of the whole House and a majority of MPs for England was needed 
for any legislation certified by the Speaker as England-only in its territorial reach. 
 This article explains the logic behind the mobilisation of the Conservative Party in 
this way in England, and reflects on the trajectory this may be opening up for that party. It 
does so through an analysis of the findings of the Future of England Survey (FoES) of 2014 
(Jeffery et al 2014). The 2014 FoES2 was designed to deepen and develop the insights from 
two earlier FoES surveys (Wyn Jones et al 2012; 2013) which had revealed political attitudes 
in England that were doubly distinctive: they were not shared in other parts of the UK; and 
they were associated with the strength of English national identity claimed by respondents.  
The 2014 survey sought to throw further light on how England is different within the 
UK, focusing on attitudes towards Scotland in the light of the 2014 referendum, on how 
England should be governed, and on European integration and immigration. It also 
explored how far such distinctive views could be seen both as a national ‘project’ – a set of 
aspirations resonant across all parts of England and associated clearly with English national 
identity – but also as a nationalist project amenable to articulation and mobilisation in party 
politics. The article will explore these questions in turn before returning to the party political 
dimension of this new English nationalism and the challenges it poses for the Conservative 
Party. 
 
 
How is England Different? 
 
England’s difference has four features: its ‘devo-anxiety’ about Scotland’s place in the UK; 
an emerging demand for English self-government; and views on both European integration 
and immigration which are different from those in Scotland and (less so) Wales. 
 
Devo-anxiety 
We coined the term ‘devo-anxiety’ following the first FoES, conducted in late 2011. There 
appeared then to be a strong perception in England that devolution had conferred two kinds 
of advantage on Scotland (and to a lesser extent Wales and less so still Northern Ireland) 
that were unfair to England: the ability of Scottish MPs to vote in the House of Commons on 
policy matters in England which are now devolved in Scotland (the so-called West Lothian 
Question, to which EVEL is presented as an answer); and a long term pattern of higher per 
capita levels of public spending than in England (Wyn Jones et al 2012: 9-12).  
The unusual context of the Scottish referendum in 2014 enabled us to explore English 
anxieties about Scotland through the lens of the two possible outcomes of the referendum. 
On the Yes side, the Scottish Government had set out a prospectus for independence which 
involved strong, continuing and friendly partnership with the rest of the UK. This was not, 
on the whole, a prospectus welcomed by English voters. Perhaps the most prominent issue 
in the independence debate was the ambition of the Scottish Government to continue a 
currency union with the rest of the UK – an ambition which the coalition Government (and 
indeed Labour in opposition) explicitly rejected. So did a clear majority – 53 per cent – of 
FoES respondents in 2014, with only 23 per cent in favour of Scotland continuing to use the 
pound. More disagreed than agreed that the rest of the UK should help secure an 
independent Scotland’s membership of the EU and NATO. Only on the question of 
maintaining passport-free travel between England and Scotland did respondents – in this 
case by a resounding majority – agree with the vision the Scottish Government had set out. 
The general impression, passport-free travel aside, is that people in England would have 
inclined to a tough line in independence negotiations with Scotland.  
 In the run-up to the referendum the parties campaigning against independence – 
Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat – had each set out separate proposals for 
additional devolution for Scotland in the event of a No vote. The proposals had considerable 
common ground around additional tax and welfare devolution. A commitment to pursue 
this common ground was firmed up in the so-called ‘Vow’ made by the then party leaders, 
Cameron, Miliband and Nick Clegg two days before the referendum. The Vow also pledged 
to maintain the Barnett formula, the mechanism which since the late 1970s has assured 
higher public spending per head in Scotland than in England. Cameron then reaffirmed the 
commitments in the Vow in the same statement on 19 September 2014 that announced his 
ambition to introduce EVEL and with that resolve the West Lothian question.  
 The 2014 FoES gives clear insight into English attitudes on these issues. On both tax 
and welfare devolution around forty per cent agreed Scotland should have more powers, 
with only around a quarter disagreeing. So people in England appeared comfortable with 
additional devolution for Scotland. And they agreed emphatically – by 62 per cent to 12 per 
cent – that Scottish MPs should be prevented from voting on laws that apply only to 
England. But they disagreed emphatically with the implication in the Vow that, by 
maintaining the Barnett formula, higher levels of public spending in Scotland should be 
protected: some 56 per cent agreed and just nine per cent disagreed that ‘levels of public 
spending in Scotland should be reduced to levels in the rest of the UK.’ There may be a logic 
here not present in the Vow. On the one hand if Scotland wanted more powers over its own 
affairs, then fine but it should be prepared to be more self-reliant financially in doing so. On 
the other, the way England is governed should also become more self-contained, beyond the 
influence of Scottish MPs and without transfers of (what appear to be understood as) 
English tax revenues to fund higher spending in Scotland. People in England appeared to 
want a clearer demarcation of the way Scotland is governed and funded from the way 
England is governed and funded.  
 
Governing England 
The 2014 FoES used a number of different question wordings to explore how the English 
think they should be governed. In three of them respondents were asked to express 
preferences for institutional options relative to one another, and in another set of questions 
were asked for responses to different options one by one. Options were varied in the 
questions on relative preference, but with three institutional options common to all of them: 
the status quo; EVEL; and a standalone English Parliament. In each question variant EVEL 
was the most popular option, clearly ahead of an English Parliament as an alternative to the 
status quo. And strikingly the maximum level of support attained by the status quo was 
twenty-five per cent.  
 This unhappiness with status quo was underlined by the other set of questions 
asking whether respondents agreed or not with individual institutional changes. Here we 
asked in turn for respondents’ views on EVEL and an English Parliament, alongside two 
other options which have occasionally been mooted: UK Government ministers for each 
English region (as was briefly the case in the early 2000s); and a Secretary of State of 
England. Surprisingly, and perhaps illogically, there was majority support for each of these 
options. We suspect this underlines the sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo by 
revealing an appetite for (more or less any) change to the current governing arrangements 
for England. And once again – by some way – EVEL was the most popular of these 
institutional options, with 69 per cent agreeing (and just eight per cent disagreeing) it should 
be introduced.  
 This combination of dissatisfaction with the status quo and EVEL as the most 
popular change option challenges received wisdom. This is in part because the main source 
of data on constitutional attitudes in England prior to the recent FoES surveys, the British 
Social Attitudes (BSA) survey, has yet to offer EVEL as an option to respondents in England, 
despite it being a policy espoused by a major political party – the Conservatives – for around 
fifteen years. And that received wisdom is buttressed by a standard question pairing 
pioneered by BSA and associated surveys which asks and compares which level of 
government does and which ought to have most influence over how England (and Scotland 
and Wales) are run. Table One sets out the findings of this pairing from the 2014 FoES.  
 
Table One about here 
 
In Scotland and Wales respondents unambiguously think the UK Government ought 
to have less influence than it does (with their respective devolved governments stepping in 
instead). In England – reiterating earlier findings in the BSA – respondents think the UK 
Government ought to have more influence than now (and the EU less, a point we return to 
below). This comparison can, but should not be, taken to mean people in England are happy 
with the status quo. The 2014 FoES also asked respondents to consider a scenario in which 
‘there were different types of institutions in England’ as part of the ‘ought’ menu of options. 
This added the options of an English Parliament and elected regional assemblies. Following 
the Scottish referendum we carried out another survey in England in October 2014 while the 
Smith Commission was deliberating about the future of Scottish devolution. In this we 
updated the ‘ought’ options also to include EVEL (in light of the Prime Minister’s 19 
September announcement) and city-regions (in light of the ‘northern powerhouse’ debate on 
devolution to city-regions in England). The findings are in Table Two, with the different 
options arranged across five possible levels of government, from local to EU.  
 
Table Two about here 
 
The figures in Table Two, and their comparison with those in Table One, need to be 
treated with a degree of caution. They present different options at different points in time, 
and those in Table Two include hypothetical future options and those in Table One currently 
available options. Nonetheless they signal that preference for the status quo of governing 
England through UK-level institutions quickly ebbs if other options for governing England 
are made available, with support for ‘most influence’ at UK level falling to levels 
comparable with those in Wales and Scotland in Table One. And among those other options 
it is striking that England-wide options are the most popular, and that when EVEL is offered 
it becomes the most favoured of all options. This suggests a dissatisfaction that is about the 
government of England as a whole and that forms of local and regional devolution are not 
deemed sufficient to assuage that dissatisfaction. 
 
Europe and Immigration 
A dissatisfaction about how England is governed is clearly a matter of special concern in 
England. So, logically, are English concerns about the advantages Scotland is perceived to 
have relative to England. We turn now to explore whether attitudes to European integration 
and immigration are also distinctive in England. Debates about the scope of European 
integration and, more recently, continued EU membership have typically taken the UK as a 
whole as the unit of analysis. Public attitudes research has not generally sought to explore 
these questions in as differentiated way across UK nations, and where it has the suggestion 
has been that there are no significant differences in EU attitudes across the UK nations (e.g. 
Curtice 2013: 9). Similar assumptions have been made about immigration. The 2014 FoES 
survey in England was accompanied by parallel surveys in Scotland and Wales designed 
against this background to identify and account for any national differences within the UK 
on attitudes to Europe and immigration.  
 On Europe the finding was that England was a little more Eurosceptical than Wales 
and significantly more so than in Scotland. Opinion in England was split evenly on the 
question whether membership of the EU is a ‘good thing’ or a ‘bad thing’ (34 per cent to 34 
percent, with another 19 per cent saying ‘neither’ and the rest opting for ‘don’t know’). In 
Wales ‘good thing’ nudged ahead at 35 per cent to 32 per cent thinking the EU as a ‘bad 
thing (with 20 per cent opting for neither). But in Scotland the balance was 43:27 per cent in 
favour of the EU as a ‘good thing’ (with 17 per cent opting for neither). On the question of a 
hypothetical referendum on the UK’s EU membership the balance among respondents in 
England was 40:37 per cent to leave, in Wales a slim margin of 39:35 per cent to stay, and in 
Scotland a clear margin of 48:32 per cent to stay (with other respondents opting for ‘won’t 
vote’ and ‘don’t know’ options). A third measure of attitudes to European integration was 
given in Table One above: the extent to which respondents think the EU ‘has most influence’ 
over how the respective nations are run. Here, England is clearly distinct from both Scotland 
and Wales with 26 per cent believing the EU currently has most influence as compared to 
four and six per cent respectively. People in England think that the EU is intrusive in the 
way they are governed, and do so much more than people in Wales and Scotland.  
 This distinctiveness of England as compared to Wales and, especially, Scotland, is 
less clear on immigration. The 2014 FoES showed that there were equally strong concerns 
about immigration in both England and Wales, with concerns in Scotland less pronounced 
but still considerable. When asked about ‘the most important issues facing the country at 
this time’, immigration was behind the economy at second place in England and Wales 
(chosen respectively by 54 and 51 per cent of respondents). In Scotland immigration was 
third at a lower but still considerable 38 per cent, behind the economy and, understandably 
at the time, Scottish independence. When asked about how much, using a 0-10 scale, 
respondents supported ‘restricting immigration into the UK’, 44 per cent in England and 46 
per cent in Wales opted for point ten on the scale, denoting the strongest level of support for 
restrictions, as compared with 38 per cent in Scotland. Similarly, and tapping the 
contemporary association of immigration as a problem of the EU, 67 per cent in both 
England and Wales agreed that ‘the EU has made migration between European countries 
too easy’, with Scotland at a lower but still clear majority of 59 per cent.  
 
 
An English project? 
 
So, alongside their concerns about Scottish devolution and how England should be 
governed, respondents in England also had strong concerns about the EU and immigration. 
The latter were generally close to those held in Wales, though respondents in Scotland 
occupied a more distinctive position (especially on the EU, less markedly on immigration). 
The earlier FoES surveys suggested this complex of dissatisfactions was linked in its 
relationship to English identity: English (as opposed to British) identifiers in England were 
disproportionately dissatisfied. This is a finding reinforced in two ways by the findings of 
the 2014 FoES.  
First, English identity remains a common denominator of dissatisfaction. One 
identity measure used in the 2014 FoES was a question which required respondents to 
choose between an English and a British identity. Those who gave a view were evenly split 
at 43 per cent English and 43 per cent British. Table Three cross-tabulates the findings of this 
question with a range of the indicators of dissatisfaction discussed above. In every case 
English identifiers were around ten points more dissatisfied than the average of all 
respondents in England. In every case British identifiers were less dissatisfied than average. 
Feeling English meant feeling disproportionately dissatisfied about England’s lot. 
 
Table Three about here 
 
Second, as Table Four confirms, national identity and attitudes on the EU and 
immigration have different associations in Scotland and Wales as compared to England. We 
lack an equivalent forced choice identity question for our Scottish and Welsh samples, so use 
instead the so-called Moreno question which was used in England, Scotland and Wales. The 
Moreno question plots identity on a five point scale, ranging from ‘Only English’ (or Scottish 
or Welsh) at one end and ‘Only British’ at the other. Table Four combines the ‘Only’ and 
‘More than’ options either side of the midpoint of the scale and cross tabulates these against 
the EU and immigration questions in Table Three. We do not find a pattern in Wales and 
Scotland in which Welsh/Scottish identifiers are more dissatisfied with the EU and 
immigration than average, as English identifiers are in England. Feeling Scottish in Scotland 
and Welsh in Wales appears if anything to be associated with less Eurosceptical attitudes 
and reduced concerns about immigration. So even though English attitudes on Europe and 
immigration are close to those in Wales (but less so Scotland) in absolute terms, they are 
distinguished in England by their clear association with English national identity. 
 
Table Four about here 
 
 In that sense we can begin to talk about a national ‘project’ in England in which 
English national identity is associated with a set of specifically English political attitudes. 
This sense of a national project is underlined by the absence of strong variation by region 
within England on the various concerns about Scotland, the institutional recognition of 
England, the EU and immigration discussed in this article. The final column in Table Three 
presents the extent of variation in attitudes on these concerns in eight of the nine ‘standard’ 
regions in England, with the responses in the last – London – in parenthesis. London does 
appear to be somewhat different, likely because respondents in London were also rather less 
English than average in the identity choice they made. But London aside, and with the 
partial exception of the EU questions, variation across regions is remarkably low. It appears 
that the English ‘project’ is one both clearly associated with English national identity and a 
uniform, nationwide one. 
 
The Party Politics of Englishness 
Feeling both English and variously concerned about Scotland, the EU, immigration and how 
England is governed was also associated with patterns of support for particular political 
parties in the 2014 FoES (Table Five). Feeling British barely distinguished the supporters of 
the three established parties – Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat, though UKIP 
supporters felt significantly less British than average. However, feeling English divided left 
and right: Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters were less English than average, and 
Conservative and UKIP supporters more English. On all but one of the other measures in 
Table Five – Scots MPs voting on English laws – there was a similar left-right divide. Labour 
and Liberal Democrat supporters were generally less dissatisfied than average (excepting 
LibDem views on the West Lothian Question). In all cases Conservative and UKIP 
supporters were more dissatisfied than average and in all cases UKIP supporters were the 
most dissatisfied.  
 
Table Five about here 
 
The relative closeness of views of Conservative and UKIP supporters is underlined by the 
vote choice in the 2010 UK election recalled by the UKIP supporters in the 2014 FoES: 42 per 
cent recalled voting for the Conservatives in 2010, nineteen per cent LibDem and fourteen 
per cent Labour (with the rest split between 2010 non-voters, UKIP voters and voters for 
other parties). So Conservatives were not just close in their views to UKIP supporters, but 
UKIP’s support – echoing analysis by Ford and Goodwin (2014: 166-70) – drew more on 
former Conservatives than supporters of any other party. Table Six takes this analysis 
further in two multinomial logit regressions designed to differentiate the features of groups 
of party supporters of FoES respondents in 2014. The first model includes demographic 
factors known to influence party affiliation, along with forced choice English identity. The 
reference category is Conservative supporters. The significant relationships are marked by 
asterisks. So Labour supporters (it will not surprise) are distinguished from Conservative 
supporters by being younger and more female (and UKIP supporters older), while both 
Labour and UKIP supporters are less likely to be middle class than Conservatives. And both 
Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters are less English, and UKIP supporters more 
English than Conservatives.  
 
Table Six about here 
 
 Model two tests whether the concerns discussed in this article – on Scotland, English 
self-government, the EU and immigration – are related to the politicisation of identity in 
England. What is striking is that here English identity loses its significance in distinguishing 
Conservative from other supporters, while concerns about Scotland, self-government, the 
EU and immigration in each case distinguish Labour from Conservative supporters, in three 
of four cases Liberal Democrat from Conservative supporters, and (in the other direction) 
UKIP from Conservative supporters on the EU and immigration. The difference between the 
two models suggests that English identity is an intervening variable which structures 
political attitudes – and differentiates the supporters of political parties on a left-right axis – 
on England’s ‘national project’.  
 
 
Conclusion: the Conservative Dilemma 
 
At this point we can return to the issue set out in the opening comments in this article: why 
David Cameron opened up the English question after the Scottish referendum. The answer 
is clear enough. Tables Five and Six show that UKIP and Conservative supporters overlap in 
their attitudes. And there was evidence of a drift of supporters from the Conservative Party 
to UKIP in the run-up to the 2015 UK election. UKIP’s achievement in 2015 – boosting its 
share of the vote by 9.5 per cent to its best ever general election result of 12.6 per cent – 
underlined the scale of the UKIP threat. It suggested that UKIP was no longer simply 
garnering ‘second order’ protest votes at European elections but building a bigger and more 
stable ‘core’ support (c.f. Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2012) that could stick with the party also 
in a general election. And it pointed to a capacity for the party to step out of its ‘niche’ of 
Euroscepticism (Lynch, Whitaker and Loomes 2012) and mobilise support around other 
issues including immigration but also what Whitaker and Lynch (2011: 369) called 
‘dissatisfaction with the political system more broadly’.  
FoES 2014 shows that this dissatisfaction had a particular form in England, with a 
complex of distinctively English political attitudes – what we have called a national project – 
held in a fairly uniform way across the whole of England, and held most strongly by those 
with an English identity. People in England – and English identifiers in particular – felt 
disadvantaged relative to Scotland, intruded upon by the EU, and deeply concerned by 
immigration. Their reaction to these ‘others’ connects with a demand for England’s 
institutional recognition, and EVEL is their top choice. This mix of identity and grievance 
has a party-political dimension. UKIP supporters appear both very English and very 
aggrieved. Conservative supporters are also English and aggrieved, though a bit less 
strongly on both counts.  
Given, as in Table Six that Englishness shapes the sense of grievance felt in England, 
an obvious response by the Conservative Party has been to emphasise an English agenda. 
Getting serious about introducing EVEL following the Scottish referendum and developing 
an English Manifesto at the 2015 UK election identified England as a distinctive electoral 
background for the Conservatives. It also marked out a strategy to compete with UKIP on 
that battleground and stem the drift of Conservatives to UKIP in England. That strategy had 
obvious short term electoral logic. But it also challenged the longer term foundations of the 
Conservative Party. Robert Hazell wrote in 2006 that EVEL could be ‘impossible to 
implement in practice’ because of difficulties which he saw as ‘insuperable at both a 
technical and a political level’ (Hazell 2006: 42). There are indeed very significant technical 
challenges, as the Mackay Commission (2013) confirmed. It is interesting what Hazell saw as 
the insuperable political difficulty. This had to do with what he saw as the unlikelihood of 
the obvious beneficiary of EVEL – a future Conservative government – ever implementing it, 
because if they did ‘the Conservatives could no longer claim to be unionist, but would have 
become an English party’ (Hazell 2006: 43).  
Indeed. That is the Conservative Party’s dilemma. It has an opportunity – a 
temptation? – to plough further the furrow opened up on 19 September 2014 and articulate a 
new English nationalism. Given its enduring weakness in Scotland this would be logical 
enough; it has little in terms of electoral strength at Westminster to lose. But by doing this 
the Conservatives would undermine their claim to be a party of the union. Are they ready 
for such a transformative step? 
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Table One: Which Does/Ought to Have Most Influence in England, Scotland and Wales?  
 Does have most influence Ought to have most influence 
 England Scotland Wales England Scotland Wales 
UK Government 58 41 43 72 16 27 
Devolved Government - 40 35 - 67 57 
Local Councils 4 3 4 16 5 6 
European Union 26 4 6 1 0 0 
None of these 1 1 0 2 1 1 
Don’t Know 11 12 11 8 10 9 
N 3,705 1,014 1,027 3,705 1,014 1,027 
Source: Future of England Survey 2014. 
 
Table Two. Which Ought to Have Most Influence in England? 
 Future of England Survey April 2014 Smith Commission Survey Oct 2014 
Level  %  % 
Local  Local Councils 16 Local Councils 13 
Regional  Elected Regional Assemblies 10 Elected Regional Assemblies 9 
  City-Regions 7 
England-wide   EVEL 23 
English Parliament 31 English Parliament 17 
UK-wide  UK Government 29 UK Parliament as now 11 
European European Union 1 European Union 1 
Don’t 
Know/Other 
 13  19 
n  3,705  1,000 
Source: Future of England Survey 2014; Smith Commission Survey. 
 
Table Three. A National Project 
 England 
% 
English 
identifiers 
% 
British 
identifiers 
% 
Variation 
by region 
(London) 
% 
Devo-Anxiety     
   Agree reduce Scottish spending to UK average 56 65 53 55-61 (49) 
   Agree Scottish MPs not to vote on English laws 62 71 58 61-65 (59) 
Governing England     
   Introduce EVEL 69 78 65 65-74 (61) 
   EU has most influence on how England is run 26 34 19 21-29 (18) 
Euro-Scepticism     
   EU a bad thing 34 45 26 26-40 (28) 
   Vote to leave EU 40 52 32 34-47 (33) 
Hostility to Immigration     
  10/10 in favour of immigration 44 57 37 41-50 (31) 
  Agree EU has made migration too easy 67 77 64 65-72 (51) 
n 3,705 1,535 1,635 - 
Source: Future of England Survey 2014. 
 
Table Four. National Identity, the EU and Immigration 
 English/Welsh/Scottish Identity British Identity 
 England 
% 
Wales 
% 
Scotland 
% 
England 
% 
Wales 
% 
Scotland 
% 
Euro-Scepticism       
  EU a bad thing 49 33 27 24 34 36 
  Vote to leave EU 55 36 30 29 38 35 
Hostility to 
Immigration 
      
  10/10 in favour of 
immigration 
57 45 33 30 47 37 
  Agree EU has made 
migration too easy 
79 69 55 60 73 64 
n 1125 357 467 722 306 168 
Source: Future of England Survey 2014. 
 
Table Five. The Party Politics of Englishness 
 England 
% 
Labour 
% 
LibDem 
% 
Cons 
% 
UKIP 
% 
Identity      
   English 43 37 29 50 60 
   British 43 48 47 44 33 
Devo-Anxiety      
   Agree reduce Scottish spending to UK 
average 
56 50 54 69 70 
   Agree Scottish MPs not to vote on 
English laws 
62 52 67 73 81 
Governing England      
   Introduce EVEL 69 61 71 79 90 
   EU has most influence on how England 
is run 
26 14 12 30 63 
Euro-Scepticism      
   EU a bad thing 34 23 13 39 81 
   Vote to leave EU 40 28 17 49 88 
Hostility to Immigration      
  10/10 in favour of immigration 44 32 21 53 85 
  Agree EU has made migration too easy 67 60 49 80 94 
n 3705 934 385 969 415 
Source: Future of England Survey 2014. 
 
Table Six. Voting intention by socio-demographics and political attitudes 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Labour 
vs Cons 
LibDem 
vs Cons 
UKIP 
vs Cons 
 Labour 
vs Cons 
LibDem 
vs Cons 
UKIP 
vs Cons 
Age  -0.015*** 0.005 0.011**  -0.007* 0.013** 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
Female 0.231* -0.143 0.195  0.381*** 0.086 0.019 
 (0.103) (0.146) (0.128)  (0.110) (0.155) (0.136) 
Middle class -0.571*** 0.093 -0.420**  -0.806*** -0.243 -0.148 
 (0.104) (0.152) (0.130)  (0.113) (0.162) (0.138) 
English identity        
    -0.356*** -0.697*** 0.364**  0.085 -0.222 0.026 
 (0.107) (0.161) (0.135)  (0.117) (0.173) (0.145) 
   Other 1.026*** 1.515*** 0.634*  0.787*** 1.229*** 0.610* 
 (0.201) (0.225) (0.277)  (0.215) (0.242) (0.295) 
Reduce Scottish spending  -0.225*** -0.098 -0.060 
     (0.057) (0.079) (0.071) 
Introduce EVEL  -0.337*** -0.186* 0.182 
     (0.058) (0.076) (0.093) 
EU a bad thing  -0.328** -0.965*** 1.462*** 
     (0.120) (0.199) (0.162) 
Restrict immigration  -2.036*** -2.739*** 2.444*** 
     (0.239) (0.291) (0.537) 
Constant 1.003*** -1.241*** -1.451***  3.930*** 1.491*** -4.614*** 
 (0.179) (0.265) (0.246)  (0.302) (0.395) (0.585) 
        
χ2 254.0  939.5 
Pseudo R2 (McFadden) 0.044  0.161 
N 2,274  2,274 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Coefficients are multinomial logits with standard errors in 
parentheses. 
Source: Future of England Survey 2014.  
 
                                                     
1  Jeffery and Henderson lecture at the University of Edinburgh, Scully and Wyn Jones at 
Cardiff University. Their thanks are due to Robert Lineira for his assistance in writing this article. 
2  The Future of England Survey (FoES) was funded under the Future of the UK and Scotland 
programme of the Economic and Social Research Council. Fieldwork was conducted by YouGov 
between 11-22 April 2014. The online survey included a sample of 3705 adults (age 18+) in England. 
For the first time we added samples of 1014 Scottish and 1027 Welsh respondents to allow us to 
identity whether views in England were similar to those held by Scottish and Welsh residents.  
